Builtin Policies

Omnigent ships with policies for common guardrails, organized into two categories: Safety and Cost Control. Your Omnigent can apply any of these by name when you ask it to add a policy, or you can reference them in YAML by their full path in the handler field.

All builtin policies live under omnigent.policies.builtins.

Safety

PolicyWhat it doesParameters
ask_on_os_toolsASKs before any file or shell operation.None
block_skillsPrevents specific skills from loading.blocked (string[], required)
block_working_dir_changesBlocks shell commands that change the working directory.block_cd (bool), block_worktree (bool), allowed_dirs (string[]), action ("deny" or "ask")
cel_policyWrite custom policy logic using CEL (Common Expression Language), a safe, non-Turing-complete expression language.expression (CEL expression string), reason (deny message)
deny_pii_in_llm_requestScans outgoing messages for PII and blocks or flags them.pii_types (string[]), action ("DENY" or "ASK")
enforce_sandboxForces a sandbox configuration on agent start.sandbox_type, allow_network, write_paths, read_paths
gcalendar_policyControls Google Calendar. Defaults to read-only.None
gdrive_policyControls Google Drive, Docs, Sheets, and Slides access. Writes restricted to agent-created files by default. Optionally enforces Bell-LaPadula "no write-down": once the session reads a confidential file, its writes are confined to that set.read_all, allow_create, write_files, read_files, comment_files, confidential_files (string[]), write_down_action ("DENY" or "ASK", default "DENY")
github_policyControls GitHub read/write access across MCP tools and shell commands.read_all, write_repos, write_branches
gmail_policyControls Gmail. Defaults to read + draft, no send.allow_read, allow_send, allow_drafts
intent_based_authorizationRecords the first user message as the session's intent, then ASKs before any tool call that has no plausible connection to that intent. Requires an llm: config block; fails open when none is available.None
max_tool_calls_per_sessionDENYs after a total tool-call limit is reached.limit (int, default 100)
prompt_policyEvaluate policy decisions using an LLM. The policy sends the event context to a model and interprets the response as ALLOW/ASK/DENY. Useful for nuanced decisions that can't be expressed as static rules.prompt (system instructions for the evaluator model)
risk_score_policyAccumulate a risk score from tool calls and sensitive data labels. Escalates guarded tools to ASK or DENY once the score exceeds a threshold.threshold (int), tool_points (object mapping tool names to points), sensitive_labels (object mapping labels to points), guarded_tools (string[]), escalate_action ("ASK" or "DENY")

Orchestration

Safety guardrails for supervisor agents that dispatch sub-agents (like Polly) — they keep fan-out bounded, writes contained, and dangerous shell commands in check. They live under omnigent.policies.builtins.orchestration.

PolicyWhat it doesParameters
blast_radiusClassifies shell commands (sys_os_shell, native Bash, Pi native bash) as safe, risky (ASK), or catastrophic (DENY), e.g. rm -rf / or force-push.gate_pushes (bool, default true), deny_reason
spawn_boundsLimits the number of sub-agent dispatches per turn to prevent runaway fan-out.max_dispatches_per_turn (int, default 5), dispatch_tools
headless_subagent_purpose_guardRequires every sub-agent dispatch to declare a purpose (implement, review, explore, search).allowed_purposes (string[]), deny_reason
worktree_guardBlocks file writes outside the worker's git worktree to prevent cross-branch contamination.allowed_root (string, default .worktrees), deny_reason
read_only_osDenies every file-mutating tool so a report-only agent can read and run shell but never change code.deny_reason

Confine confidential Google Drive data (gdrive_policy)

gdrive_policy can layer Bell-LaPadula's classic "no write-down" rule on top of its access controls. You declare a set of confidential documents up front with confidential_files (file IDs or Google URLs). The rule engages only once the session reads one of those files: from then on, its writes are confined to the confidential set. A write to — or creation of — any other file would move confidential data into a less-protected place, so it is blocked.

# Omnigent config (policies block)
policies:
  confidential_containment:
    type: function
    handler: omnigent.policies.builtins.google.gdrive_policy
    factory_params:
      # The confidential compartment: file IDs or Google URLs.
      confidential_files:
        - "1ConfidentialStrategyDocID"
      # Allow creating new files, so a create can be shown being gated as a
      # write-down rather than blocked outright by the base access rules.
      allow_create: true
      # DENY (hard block) or ASK (require human approval) on a write-down.
      write_down_action: DENY

Key behaviors:

Because the confidential set is declared explicitly rather than inferred from a per-document classification label, the rule works on any Google Drive tenant.

Cost Control

PolicyWhat it doesParameters
cost_budgetTracks cumulative LLM spend per session. ASKs at soft thresholds, blocks expensive models at the hard limit.max_cost_usd (required), ask_thresholds_usd, expensive_models
detect_task_switchUses the server-level LLM to detect when a user starts a new unrelated task and nudges starting a fresh session.min_turns (int), history_window (int), action ("ASK" or "DENY", default "ASK"), classification_prompt (string)
deny_trivial_to_expensive_modelClassifies messages as trivial or complex. Routes trivial tasks away from expensive models.expensive_models (string[], required), classification_prompt (string)
subagent_cost_budgetGates a sub-agent on its own subtree LLM spend. Blocks expensive models at the hard limit, ASKs at soft thresholds. Attach to a child via sys_session_send's cost_budget argument.max_cost_usd, ask_thresholds_usd, expensive_models
user_daily_cost_budgetSame as cost_budget, but enforced per-user daily across all sessions.max_cost_usd (required), ask_thresholds_usd, expensive_models

Usage examples

Common scenarios: warn an engineer before a session gets expensive, cap daily spend per user across all sessions, or block expensive models once a session hits a hard limit while still letting work continue on a cheaper one.

Make spend visible before you restrict it

Start with soft thresholds only. Engineers see when they're running an expensive session and can decide whether the task warrants it. No one gets blocked; habits change on their own.

# Omnigent config (policies block)
policies:
  session_visibility:
    type: function
    handler: omnigent.policies.builtins.cost.cost_budget
    factory_params:
      ask_thresholds_usd: [1.0, 5.0]
      max_cost_usd: 999.0 # effectively no hard cap
  daily_visibility:
    type: function
    handler: omnigent.policies.builtins.cost.user_daily_cost_budget
    factory_params:
      ask_thresholds_usd: [10.0, 25.0]
      max_cost_usd: 999.0

This gives you real data on where spend is concentrated before you decide where to add guardrails.

Server-wide team policy

A reasonable starting point for a team deployment: per-user daily visibility at $25, a soft check at $50. Engineers can still use any model for any task — they just get asked before spending more than $25 in a day.

# config.yaml
policies:
  daily_budget:
    type: function
    function:
      path: omnigent.policies.builtins.cost.user_daily_cost_budget
      arguments:
        ask_thresholds_usd: [25.0, 50.0]
        max_cost_usd: 100.0
omnigent server -c config.yaml

The daily cap exists to surface sessions that are genuinely off the rails, not to penalize productive use.

detect_task_switch

Use this policy to keep sessions focused and avoid wasting tokens on stale context. On each user request, it classifies whether the latest message continues the current task or starts a new one, and returns the configured action when it detects a task switch. It requires a server llm: config and fails open if no LLM client is available.

# Omnigent config (policies block)
policies:
  keep_context_lean:
    type: function
    handler: omnigent.policies.builtins.context.detect_task_switch
    factory_params:
      min_turns: 2
      history_window: 4
      action: ASK